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Abstract
Motivation: Although some authors have claimed that sports clubs generate revenues 
from more different sources than do other non-profit organizations, relevant research is 
lacking.
Aim: To fill this gap, this paper compares sports clubs with other non-profit organizations 
in terms of the (1) revenue structure and (2) revenue sources. The analysis used data from 
the financial reports of all public benefit organizations (PBOs) registered in 2015, thereby 
covering the whole population. Thus, exploratory methods were used to compare 679 
sports clubs having PBO status with other 6 816 registered PBOs.
Results: A greater share of sports clubs (SCs) than other PBOs exploits public funding, 
particularly subsidies from local self-governments. SCs also rely on membership fees 
and other revenues (such as business activities and sponsorship) more than do other or-
ganizations. These results contribute to the knowledge of financial specificity of non-profit 
sports clubs and show which revenue sources could be used by clubs to a greater extent.
Keywords: non-profit organizations; public benefit organization; revenue structure; sports clubs
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1. Introduction
One of the three providers of mass sports alongside commercial initiatives 
and public activity, non-profit sports clubs play a key role in modern sports. 
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They create space for sports competitions, popularize mass sports, and support 
social networking (Nagel, 2008, pp. 121–141). Non-profit sports clubs differ 
from for-profit ones in the purposes of their activities (social versus business), 
funding sources (public versus private), and main forms of employment and re-
muneration (voluntary work combined with civil law contracts versus full-time 
and contractual systems) (Cieśliński & Perechuda, 2015, pp. 2185–2189).
In general, non-profit organizations (NGOs) differ in their level of revenue 
diversification, which also largely depends on their type of activity (Fischer et 
al., 2011, pp. 662–681). Furthermore, the fact of offering public or private ser-
vices and the mission of the organization affect the type and structure income 
of NGOs (Achleitner et al., 2014, pp. 85–99; Kearns, 2007, pp. 291–314). 
Among them, sports clubs have great deficiencies in basic resources, such as 
human resources, financial capabilities, networks, and infrastructure (Gumulka 
et al., 2005, pp. 12–15; Wicker & Breuer, 2011, pp. 188–201). Coates et al. 
(2014, pp. 230–248) explain that potential financial problems strongly de-
pend on the ways in which a sports club obtains financial resources: The higher 
the share of sponsoring is in the revenue structure, the lower are the public 
subsidies and the greater the financial problems can be. In addition, the increas-
ing share of public funding in the revenue structure increases the dependence 
of the clubs’ activities on the directions assigned to them by the government or 
local self-government (Sotiriadou & Wicker, 2013, pp. 297–314; Wicker et al., 
2015, pp. 5–24). On the other hand, this is public funding that is considered 
a key element of the revenue structure of sports organizations, enabling them 
to improve their financial and organizational situations (Caslavova & Berka, 
2005, pp. 204–213; Lasby & Sperling, 2007, p. 47). From these results, it 
follows that the functioning of sports clubs depends on the choice of revenue 
sources.
Some authors claim sports clubs have problems to maintain financial viabil-
ity (Cordery et al., 2013, pp. 186–199; Wicker et al., 2015, pp. 5–24), and that 
sports clubs diversify the structure of their revenues as a result of many inter-
nal and external factors, such as organizational mission, level of budget, size 
of the club, the percentage of women and so on (Barget & Chavinier-Rela, 2017, 
pp. 7–34; Wicker et al., 2013, pp. 119–136).
However, the issue of comparing revenue structures of sports clubs with that 
of other NGOs seems to be disregarded in the literature. To fill this gap, this 
research aims to study how sports clubs differ from other non-profit organiza-
tions in terms of (1) revenue structure and (2) revenue sources. Revenue struc-
ture is determined by the proportions of the revenue generated by each source 
in the organization’s total revenue. The use level of a particular revenue source 
can be determined by the number of organizations that use this source. To fulfill 
these aims, the present research will compare financial reports of sports clubs 
and other public benefit organizations (PBOs).
According to the data of the Central Statistical Office (2017, p. 22), at 
the end of 2016 there were nearly 15 000 sports clubs in Poland. Furthermore, 
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 18(3): 283–294
285
this number has been growing steadily since 1989. After fulfilling certain for-
mal requirements, sports clubs (as the non-profit organizations) may apply for 
the status of a public benefit organization. Such a status gives them a number 
of additional organizational and financial possibilities (Act on Public Good Ac-
tivity and Volunteering, 2003, article 24, paragraph 1–2 and article 27, par-
agraph 2). A PBO is allowed to receive donations of 1% of personal income 
tax, can use state and local self-government properties on preferential terms, 
and is provided with a number of tax exemptions (Act on Public Good Activity 
and Volunteering, 2003, article 24, paragraph 1–2 and article 27, paragraph 
2). Each PBO must submit an annual financial report, and this research uses all 
reports PBOs submitted in 2015.
Moreover, any club can be associated in a sports association (Act of Sport, 
2010, article 2, paragraph 2). Being members of such an association, sports 
clubs — as is typical of the European sports market — compete with each other 
in league competitions organized by this association. This creates a certain dis-
crepancy between the statutory objectives (i.e., the popularization of sports 
and physical culture) and a potential club policy to improve purely sporting per-
formance. This discrepancy can be especially serious in Poland, because Polish 
non-profit sports clubs pay much more attention to competition and sporting 
performance than do their counterparts in other European countries (Breuer et 
al., 2017). Therefore, only these kinds of sport clubs were included in the analysis.
2. Materials and methods
The data about the studied entities come from the PBOs’ annual financial re-
ports for 2015, downloaded from the database of the Ministry of Family, Labor 
and Social Policy of Poland (2018). Each PBO has to submit such a report every 
year. The report form divides revenue sources into (1) unpaid activities, (2) paid 
activities, (3) business activities, and (4) other activities (table 1). In addition 
to these data, the Ministry database includes information on the organizations’ 
assets; the revenue due to donations of 1% of personal income tax; scope of ac-
tivities; the number of members, employees, volunteers; and the descriptions 
of initiatives.
PBOs can also be classified by the form of ownership of funds received. In 
their reports, organizations specify which revenues come from private sources 
(e.g., membership fees, donations, public generosity, non-financial income), 
public sources (e.g., subsidies and donations of 1% of personal income tax), 
and others (including business activities). More detailed than that in table 1, 
this classification is used in financial reports of large organizations, that is, 
those with annual revenues of over 100 000 PLN. Thus, the analysis of reve-
nue sources divided by type of activity (table 1) applies to all sports clubs, while 
this more detailed analysis applies only to large ones. Table 2 and chart 1 show 
both analyses, the one for large organizations being presented in the second part 
of the table 2. and, respectively, right side of the chart 1. In 2015, out of 679 
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sports clubs with the PBO status, 365 were large; out of 6 816 other PBOs, 3 
879 were large. As mentioned above, however, these clubs constitute only a part 
of the non-profit sector of sports organizations: At the end of 2016, there were 
nearly 15 000 sports clubs in Poland (Central Statistical Office, 2017, p. 22).
In the analyses, we treat revenues due to donations of 1% of personal income 
tax as public sources, to make it possible to compare the results with those for 
countries which do not have such a form of tax allowance.
We will analyze the data in two steps. First, based on their statutory activ-
ities declared in the reports, we will separate PBOs which declared activities 
for disseminating physical culture and sports from other PBOs. We will then 
compare revenue sources of these two groups. Since we can analyze the whole 
population of PBOs, we will analyze the data with summary statistics, includ-
ing mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation (CV), median, skewness, 
and maximum value.
3. Results
For both sports clubs and other PBOs, the most frequent revenue source was 
unpaid activities, and, for large sports clubs, also private revenue sources (chart 
1). While a greater share of sports clubs than that of other PBOs used business 
activities to generate revenues, a smaller share of clubs used paid and other ac-
tivities. Similar shares of sports clubs and other PBOs (over 90%) used private 
and other sources. A greater share of sports clubs, however, received more pub-
lic support than that of other PBOs (92% against 78%). The difference was due 
to local government subsidies (received by 86% of clubs and only 64% of other 
PBOs) and membership fees (used by 79% of clubs and 57% of other PBOs). 
Other revenue sources, excluding rare legacies and property income, were less 
frequent in sports clubs than in other PBOs.
The revenue structure of all PBOs, including clubs, was based mainly on un-
paid activities (table 2). On average, this source had a greater share in the rev-
enues of other PBOs whereas business and other activities had greater shares 
in the revenues of sports clubs. Considering individual sources, local self-gov-
ernment subsidies showed the greatest disproportion between the two groups. 
In addition, sports clubs generated relatively more revenues from membership 
fees and other sources than did other PBOs.
Coefficient of variation confirmed a great diversity of both populations 
in terms of shares of the analyzed sources in total revenues. For most sources, 
median share was close to 0% (which means that at least half of the organ-
izations generated no revenue from such a source); some PBOs had just one 
revenue source (for such an organization, a maximum share reached 100%). It 
seems, thus, that, in general, many PBOs relied on a few revenue sources.
Taken together, these results show that public funding, used in 2015 by over 
90% of PBOs, accounted for almost 40% of the revenues of both sports clubs 
and other PBOs. The two groups, however, differed in terms of sources from 
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which they obtained public funds. For sports clubs, the key role could be at-
tributed to local self-government units, a consequence of the model of financing 
sports in Poland. Nine out of ten sports clubs received local self-government 
subsidies, which accounted for an average of 35% of the revenues all PBO sports 
clubs received in 2015. All other forms of public support — such as subsidies 
from the state budget, earmarked funds, and European funds — were used by 
no more than every tenth club, a smaller share than that for other PBOs. These 
revenue streams were, thus, less important in the revenue structure of sports 
clubs than of that in the rest of the non-profit sector. A separate category is do-
nations of 1% of personal income tax, used only slightly less often by sports clubs 
than by other PBOs, but being much less significant in their total revenues.
4. Discussion
Like Polish sports clubs, Czech ones also base on self-government funds, 
which account for 35% of their total revenues (Caslavova & Berka, 2005, pp. 
204–213). In some other countries and regions, however, public funding is 
less important, as in Canada and Spain (about a 7% share), Flanders (Belgium) 
(below 9%), and Germany (10%) (Breuer et al., 2015, pp. 187–208; Enjolras, 
2002, pp. 352–376; Lasby & Sperling, 2007, pp. 49–50; Vos et al., 2013, pp. 
55–71). Spanish sports clubs are atypical, with commercial sources dominat-
ing the revenue structure (Enjolras, 2002, pp. 352–376). The main revenue 
sources of German clubs are membership fees, donations, and subsidies (Breuer 
et al., 2015, pp. 187–208). In Spain and Canada, almost 30% and 20% of rev-
enues, respectively, come from private sources (Lasby & Sperling, 2007, pp. 
49–50). In Poland, private sources account for less than one-fourth of all rev-
enues of sports clubs.
Earlier research has indicated that many sports clubs rely on only a few 
particular revenue sources (Wicker et al., 2013, pp. 119–136), but, accord-
ing to Chang & Tuckman (1994, pp. 273–290), sports clubs more diversify 
their revenue structures than other NGOs. In Poland, a greater proportion 
of large sports clubs than that of other PBOs uses public funding, especially 
local self-government subsidies. Membership fees make another difference: 
A greater proportion of sports clubs charge membership fees. What is more, 
Polish sports clubs make profits from business activities (including sponsoring) 
more often than do other public benefit organizations, but they exploit the pos-
sibilities of paid public benefit activities less often. This agrees with the findings 
of Massarsky & Beinhacker (2002, p. 3) that the area of activity of a non-profit 
organization affects its possibilities of undertaking business activities.
According to Vocasport’s typology (Camy et al., 2004, pp. 54–61), the solu-
tions adopted in Poland for financing sports belong to a bureaucratic configura-
tion. Most commonly used in Europe, it assumes that public authorities play an 
active role in regulating the sports system. The other configurations are a mis-
sionary one (in which clubs have large autonomy in decision-making), an entre-
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preneurial one (in which private stakeholders prevail), and a social one (which 
assumes intense cooperation between private, public, and non-governmental 
entities). Henry (2009, pp. 41–52) combined this idea with management tech-
nique, an approach Vos et al. (2013, pp. 55–71) compared the revenues of Ger-
man clubs (operating under the missionary configuration) and Flemish ones 
(operating under the social configuration). Based on membership fees, German 
clubs were, to a small extent, dependent on state support. Flemish clubs de-
pended more on subsidies — but, unlike in Poland, sports policy in Flanders is 
highly decentralized. In Poland, the centralization of sports policy takes place 
at the level of public planning determined by the government’s sport develop-
ment strategy, but local self-governments are responsible for subsidizing am-
ateur sports. Nevertheless, public funding is a key revenue source of Polish 
sports clubs, accounting for almost 40% of their revenues. It is thus clear that 
an adopted solution for financing sports affects sports clubs’ revenue structure 
and sources. Another confirmation comes from the Czech Republic: Like Po-
land, it uses the bureaucratic configuration, and Czech sports clubs’ financing is 
dominated by external sources — among which public funding, however, repre-
sents a much smaller share than that in Poland (25% of the revenues) (Caslavova 
& Berka, 2005, pp. 204–213).
5. Conclusions
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first work to compare the reve-
nue structure of sports clubs with that of other PBOs. In fact, such research has 
been scarce also for other countries (in the context of NGOs) — thus, the study 
contributes to ongoing global research on financing sports clubs. The results 
reveal a contrasting picture of the revenue structures of sports clubs and other 
PBOs in Poland. Sports clubs more often than other PBOs receive subsidies 
from local self-government units, collect membership fees, and receive non-fi-
nancial income. So, the important role subsidies play in sports clubs’ revenue 
structure — a specific situation for Poland — results from the system of sports 
financing adopted in Poland. Membership fees, on the other hand, are typi-
cal of sports clubs worldwide: Accounting for only a small share of revenues 
of other PBOs, they do play an important role in sports clubs’ revenue structure. 
Clubs use other revenue sources than the above-mentioned ones less frequently 
than do other PBOs, but they exploit public funding much more.
It shows government authorities how the organizational solutions adopted 
in Poland, a country following a bureaucratic model of sports financing, imply 
the revenues structure and sources of non-profit sport clubs. On this basis, it 
can be assumed that cross-country benchmarking is limited by contextual bar-
riers. Therefore, when adopting a solution from abroad, the organizational pat-
terns should be taken into account. As from the financial point of view SCs are 
different from other PBOs, policy makers should conduct supporting program 
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 18(3): 283–294
289
dedicated solely to sports organizations instead of treating them like typical rep-
resentatives of the third sector.
The main limitation of this study is that it dealt with only those sports clubs 
that have the status of a PBO. Considerably more work will need to be done 
to determine the factors influencing the differences in revenue structures that 
have been presented in this study. Moreover, future research should compare 
revenue sources of clubs with and without this status. It is also worth exam-
ining the dynamics of changes in the revenue structure of Polish clubs. Such 
knowledge might help check if a so-called ‘crowding out effect’ occurs in Polish 
sports clubs. This effect represents a situation in which public and private reve-
nue sources are substitutable (e.g.: Dokko, 2009, pp. 57–75; Roberts, 1984, pp. 
136–148; Warr, 1982, pp. 131–138). Some authors (Payne, 1998, pp. 323–345; 
Vesterlund, 2003, pp. 627–657), however, claim that the relationship is actu-
ally opposite: the increased level of public funding results in the increased level 
of revenues from non-public sources.
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Appendix
Table 1.
Classification of revenue sources of PBOs by type of activity
Activity Description Revenue sources
unpaid 
activity Activities for which an NGO is not paid.
 – membership fees,
 – donations,
 – bequests,
 – legacies,
 – grants,
 – subsidies,
 – income from public generosity.
paid 
activity
Activities for which an NGO is paid; included are activities 
listed in the next column, except for sponsorship.  – sale of manufactured goods,
 – provision of services in the field of re-
habilitation of persons with disabilities 
or occupational integration of people 
at risk of social exclusion,
 – sales of donations,
 – sponsorship*.
business 
activity
A paid activity becomes a business activity if:
 – a remuneration for the activity exceeds the operating 
costs; or
 – the average monthly salary of employers of the organ-
ization exceeds three times the average monthly salary 
in the enterprise sector.
other 
activities
Other activities, not listed in the Act on Public Good 
Activity and Volunteering (2003).
 – income from property, capital invest-
ments, and endowment funds,
 – compensatory damages,
 – other sources: credits, loans.
Note:
* Sponsorship is a business activity and, thus, cannot be treated as a statutory paid activity (Liżewski, 
2013, p. 43).
Source: Own elaboration based on the Act on Public Good Activity and Volunteering (2003) 
and Adamiak et al. (2016).
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 18(3): 283–294
293
Table 2.
Summary statistics for shares the analyzed sources had in the revenues of sports clubs 
(SCs) and other PBOs in 2015
Specification N Mean (in %)
Standard 
deviation 
(in %)
Coefficient 
of variation 
(in %)
Median 
(in %) Skewness
Maximum 
(in %)
unpaid activity
SCs 679 55 43 77 64 –0.17 100
PBOs 6 816 64 39 61 85 –0.60 100
paid activity
SCs 679 10 23 235 0 2.58 100
PBOs 6 816 11 24 221 0 2.41 100
business activity
SCs 679 7 20 267 0 3.03 100
PBOs 6 816 4 14 401 0 4.85 100
other activities
SCs 679 27 37 137 1 0.97 100
PBOs 6 816 21 34 160 1 1.42 100
public sources
SCs 365 41 28 71 38 0.23 100
PBOs 3 879 49 36 87 37 0.24 100
European Union subsidies
SCs 365 1 5 841 0 11.84 84
PBOs 3 879 4 15 358 0 4.16 99
donations of 1% personal 
income tax
SCs 365 2 5 202 1 8.09 65
PBOs 3 879 8 17 199 2 3.11 100
governmental subsidies
SCs 365 2 9 438 0 5.61 77
PBOs 3 879 9 22 226 0 2.49 100
self-government subsidiaries
SCs 365 35 28 79 34 0.37 100
PBOs 3 879 21 29 141 5 1.38 100
target funds
SCs 365 1 6 629 0 7.14 59
PBOs 3 879 7 19 284 0 3.17 99
private sources
SCs 365 23 24 104 16 1.31 100
PBOs 3 879 21 27 129 9 1.50 100
membership fees
SCs 365 9 16 180 1 2.74 96
PBOs 3879 3 10 373 0 5.80 100
donations from individuals
SCs 365 7 14 193 1 3.16 98
PBOs 3879 9 18 193 2 3.00 100
donations from firms
SCs 365 4 12 285 0 4.39 91
PBOs 3879 7 17 243 0 3.40 100
public generosity
SCs 365 <0 1 951 0 11.32 8
PBOs 3879 <1 6 508 0 8.60 100
inheritances
SCs 365 2 11 464 0 5.91 100
PBOs 3879 1 7 686 0 9.31 98
other sources
SCs 365 36 30 85 31 0.56 100
PBOs 3879 29 32 109 16 0.90 100
Source: Own elaboration based on Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy of Poland (2018).
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Chart 1.
The shares of sports clubs and other PBOs in generating revenues in 2015 from 
the analyzed sources (in %)
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Source: Own elaboration based on Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy of Poland (2018).
